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Knowledge, Perception and Analysis 
Quassim Cassam 
1. Introduction. 
A point that Strawson often emphasized in his writings is that the concepts of 
knowledge and perception are closely linked. For example, the idea of such a link does 
important work in his exposition and defence of a causal analysis of perception.
1
 According 
to this analysis a material object M is perceived by a subject S only if M causes an 
experience in S. Why should this be? One reason, according to Strawson, is that such a 
causal requirement on perception is implied by perception‟s knowledge-giving role.2 This is 
one sense in which, in the words of Strawson‟s last book, „we could not explain all the 
features of the concept of sense perception without reference to the concept of knowledge‟ 
(1992: 19). 
I‟m not going to be concerned here with the merits or otherwise of a causal analysis 
of perception or with the proposal that such an analysis is implied by the knowledge-giving 
role of perception. Instead, I want to focus on the supposed knowledge-giving role of 
perception. How should the idea that perception has such a role be understood? Suppose we 
say that it is somehow built into the concept of perception that perceiving an object is a way 
of acquiring knowledge of the object. Yet, as Snowdon points out in a helpful discussion of 
Strawson‟s views, „it is not a necessary truth that if S sees M then S can gain knowledge of 
M‟ (1998: 301). For example, S may not realize that he is seeing M or may be seeing M in 
a deceptive way. One challenge in this area, therefore, is to come up with a viable account 
of the knowledge-giving role of perception.  
                                                 
1
 See Strawson 2008. 
2
 Snowdon mentions the „knowledge-giving role of perception‟ in his Foreword to the 2008 edition of 
Freedom and Resentment. My account of Strawson‟s argument is indebted to Snowdon‟s Foreword.  
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In the passage in which Strawson suggests that we can‟t explain all the features of 
the concept of perception without reference to the concept of knowledge he also speculates 
that „we could not fully elucidate the concept of knowledge without reference to the 
concept of sense perception‟ (1992: 19). The possibility that the concepts of knowledge and 
perception hang together in this way is used by Strawson to make a case for his preferred 
non-reductive model of conceptual analysis. To give a reductive analysis of a concept is to 
analyse it in more basic terms. Specifically, the idea is that some concepts „can be reduced 
to, or wholly explained in terms of, some others which are felt to be more perspicuous‟ 
(1995: 16). The causal analysis of perception might be thought of as reductive in this sense 
but Strawson insists that in general he is „extremely sceptical‟ (1995: 16) about reductive 
analyses of concepts. The problem is that: 
The philosophically interesting or important concepts tend to remain obstinately 
 irreducible, in the sense that they cannot be defined away, without remainder or 
 circularity, in terms of other concepts (1995: 16).  
The recommended alternative is to think of individual concepts as belonging to an elaborate 
network of concepts such that the function of each concept could „from the philosophical 
point of view, be properly understood only by grasping its connections with the others, its 
place in the system‟ (1992: 19). Circularity needn‟t be a problem for someone who sees 
things in this way, and this is the context in which Strawson makes the point that neither 
the concept of knowledge nor that of perception can be fully elucidated without reference to 
the other. 
Should we accept that the concept of knowledge can‟t be fully elucidated without 
reference to the concept of sense perception? Obviously, a lot depends on the word „fully‟. 
 3 
Standard reductive accounts of the concept of knowledge try to analyse it terms of concepts 
like truth, belief, justification and reliability. If knowledge is justified true belief, or true 
belief caused by a generally reliable process, then perception can certainly be a source of 
knowledge. After all, perception can give one justified true beliefs about the world beyond 
and is a generally reliable process. So if this is all that Strawson means when he says that 
the concept of knowledge can‟t be fully elucidated without reference to the concept of 
perception then there is nothing especially novel or radical about his suggestion. Our most 
fundamental understanding of the concept of knowledge would be in terms of concepts like 
truth, belief, justification and reliability, and we can then go on, on this basis, to identify 
specific sources of knowledge such as perception. The status of perception as a source of 
knowledge would be, to this extent and in this sense, derivative rather than primitive. 
There is, however, a far more radical way of understanding the connection between 
perception and knowledge. The idea would be that knowledge is to be explicated, in the 
first instance, by reference to its sources.
3
 In other words, we understand what knowledge is 
by understanding how we get it or how it comes to be. Clearly, there are many different 
ways in which knowledge comes to be but an absolutely basic source of knowledge is 
perception. So we now have the proposal that „our fundamental understanding of 
knowledge is as what is yielded by perception in certain circumstances‟ (Snowdon 1998: 
301).
4
 If this is right then there would be a very clear sense in which we could not elucidate 
the concept of knowledge without reference to the concept of perception. There would still 
be more general things to be said about what it is to know but there would no longer be any 
question of basing the connection between knowledge and perception on a prior reductive 
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 See the opening of Audi 2002 for a suggestion along these lines.  
4
 This is not a view that Snowdon himself endorses. 
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analysis of the concept of knowledge. The connection between knowledge and perception 
would be primitive rather than derivative.   
These claims about knowledge, perception and analysis are all controversial so I‟m 
going to proceed as follows:  in part 2, I will say more about the knowledge-giving role of 
perception. My main suggestion will be that the best way of understanding this role would 
be in explanatory terms. In other words, reference to what subjects can perceive often has 
an important part to play in explaining how they know. In part 3, I will focus on Strawson‟s 
account of conceptual analysis in Analysis and Metaphysics and on the suggestion that our 
fundamental understanding of knowledge is as what is yielded by perception. I will argue 
that there is something right about this suggestion even though it faces some formidable 
challenges. Finally, in part 4, I will discuss Strawson‟s philosophical methodology in the 
light of more recent developments in the philosophy of philosophy.          
2. Perception and Knowledge. 
Suppose I see that the building in front of me is a barn. It would seem to follow that 
I know that the building in front of me is a barn. A familiar thought is that this follows 
because „S sees that P‟ actually entails „S knows that P‟.5 More generally, given that seeing 
that P is not the only way of perceiving that P, one might think that „S perceives that P‟ 
entails „S knows that P‟. If this is right then the sense in which perception is knowledge-
giving is that it is knowledge-entailing. Anyone who sees or perceives that P thereby knows 
that P because, as Peacocke puts it, „perceiving that P is a form of knowing that P‟ (2005: 
229). 
If perceiving that P is a form of knowing that P then it is easy to see why we could 
not explain all the features of the concept of perception without reference to the concept of 
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 See Dretske 1969, Unger 1975 and Williamson 2000 for a defence of this claim.  
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knowledge.
6
 But now consider a case in which, instead of seeing that the building in front 
of me is a barn, I simply see the barn. From „S sees a barn‟ or „S can see a barn‟, it does not 
follow that S knows that there is a barn there.
7
 This kind of seeing or perceiving is not 
knowledge-entailing. So either it is false that perception always has a knowledge-giving 
role or, as I want to argue, its having such a role need not consist in its being knowledge-
entailing. 
How might it happen that a person S sees a barn in front of him but doesn‟t know 
that there is a barn in front of him? Here are three cases: 
(a) S sees a barn but doesn‟t know what a barn is – he lacks the concept 
barn. This needn‟t prevent him from seeing the barn but he can‟t be said 
to know that there is a barn in front of him if he doesn‟t know what a 
barn is. 
(b) S sees a barn, has the concept barn but for some reason doesn‟t recognize 
what he sees as a barn. Perhaps he mistakenly believes that he is in fake 
barn country and that what he is looking at is a fake barn that looks like a 
barn from a distance.
8
 If he doesn‟t recognize what he sees as a barn then 
he doesn‟t know that it‟s a barn even if it is a barn. 
(c) S sees what is in fact a barn, he has the concept barn, and believes that 
what he is looking at is a barn but, unknown to S, he is actually in fake 
barn country. He can‟t tell the difference between a real and a fake barn 
and so he doesn‟t know that there is a barn in front of him. By the same 
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 I take it that if perceiving is a form of knowing then this is built into the concept of perception.  
7
 Notice that „S can see a barn‟ doesn‟t mean „S is able to see a barn‟. 
8
 Fake barn country contains one or two genuine barns and lots of fake barns that look a lot like barns from a 
distance. The example is associated with Alvin Goldman, who attributes it to Carl Ginet. See Goldman 1992. 
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token, he doesn‟t see that there is a barn in front of him in these 
circumstances. Yet he still sees a barn. The correct answer to the question 
„What can S see?‟ is „A barn‟.  
These cases all put pressure on the idea that there is a necessary link between knowledge 
and perception. They do not show that perception doesn‟t have a knowledge-giving role but 
they raise a question about how this role is to be understood. 
The distinction between seeing a barn and seeing that there is a barn nearby maps 
on to Dretske‟s distinction between non-epistemic or „simple‟ seeing and epistemic seeing.9 
In epistemic seeing one sees that something is the case. The main characteristics of this 
kind of seeing are that it is propositional, factive, and has epistemic implications: it implies 
something about what the perceiver knows and about his conceptual resources. If S sees 
that there is a barn nearby then there is a barn nearby. If S sees that there is a barn nearby 
then he must have the concept barn. Finally, if S sees that there is a barn nearby then he 
knows that there is a barn nearby. Simple seeing, in contrast, is non-propositional, non-
factive and lacks the epistemic implications of epistemic seeing. Simple seeing is „the 
seeing of objects and things – not facts about these things‟ (Dretske 2000: 98), and so is not 
constrained by one‟s conceptual resources. Even babies and animals that don‟t know what 
barns are can still see barns.   
If simple seeing is not knowledge-entailing and so not a form of knowing in what 
sense can it still have a knowledge-giving role? The best way of answering this question is 
to think about the role of this kind of seeing in explaining how we know some of the things 
we know about the world around us. In spelling out this idea it is helpful to keep in mind 
that if it is correct to describe a person S as knowing that P then there must be an answer to 
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the question „How does S know that P?‟.10 The claim is not that S must know the answer to 
this question but that there must be an answer. Furthermore, a satisfying answer will be one 
that explains how S knows that P. So the next question is this: what would it be to explain 
S‟s knowledge, say in the case in which what S is said to know is that there is a barn in the 
vicinity? 
A compelling thought is that, as Shoemaker puts it, „faced with the question of how 
someone knows something, the most satisfying answer we can be given is “She saw it”‟ 
(1996: 201). Seeing is, on this account, the „paradigmatic explanation of knowing‟ (ibid.). 
This is not to say that perceptual explanations are always acceptable. If it is too dark for S 
to see anything or if S is blind then „He can see it‟ clearly won‟t be a good answer to „How 
does S know that there is a barn nearby?‟. However, this doesn‟t affect Shoemaker‟s point. 
For seeing to be the paradigmatic explanation of knowing it is not necessary that „She saw 
it‟ is in all circumstances a good answer to the explanatory question. 
What kind of seeing is the paradigmatic explanation of knowing?
11
 Sometimes we 
explain how S knows that P by reference to the fact that S can see that P. Such explanations 
in terms of epistemic seeing might seem good because they are knowledge-entailing and so 
don‟t leave it open that S doesn‟t know that P.12 One might dispute the claim that S can see 
that P but once one agrees that S can see that P then that is the end of the matter: S knows 
that P and it is clear how he knows that P, unless he already knew that P or knows it in 
more than one way. In contrast, as we have seen, the mere fact that S sees a barn nearby 
does not settle the question whether he knows that there is a barn nearby. In that case, 
aren‟t we forced to admit either that „S can see it‟ is not a satisfactory answer to the 
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 I defend this claim in Cassam 2007. 
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 Shoemaker‟s formulation leaves this question open. 
12
 In Cassam 2007 I refer to this as the „finality‟ of (some) perceptual explanations. 
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question „How does S know that there is a barn nearby?‟ or that it is satisfactory only to the 
extent that it is shorthand for an explanation in terms of epistemic seeing? How can „He can 
see it‟ be a good explanation of S‟s knowledge if it leaves it open that S doesn‟t know that 
there is a barn nearby? 
The question that this raises is whether good epistemic explanations have to be 
knowledge-entailing. To see why not consider this example: S knows that Quine was born 
in Akron, and we want to know how he knows. So we ask him. His answer is that he read 
that Quine was born in Akron in Quine‟s autobiography. Is this a good answer? That is, 
does it tell us how S knows that Quine was born in Akron (assuming that S is being truthful 
about his reading habits)? Yes. Is it a knowledge-entailing explanation? No. „S read that P‟ 
does not entail „S knows that P. It can‟t possibly entail this because it doesn‟t even entail P. 
In this sense, the proposed explanation leaves it open that S does not know that P. Even if P 
is true one can still wonder whether S knows that P just because he read that P. For 
example one might be reluctant to accept that S knows that Quine was born in Akron if S 
has ignored compelling but misleading evidence that Quine‟s autobiography is full of 
factual errors. But none of this means that S‟s explanation is not a good one in the absence 
of such defeaters.
13
  
There are many non-epistemological examples that make the same point about the 
nature of explanation. Suppose that S was in London this morning and is now in Paris. How 
did he get to Paris? He caught the Eurostar from London. This explains how S got to Paris 
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 It is also worth pointing out that there are many sentences of the form „S Φs that P‟ that do entail „S knows 
that P‟ but that cannot be used to explained to explain how S knows that P. For example, it is arguable that „S 
regrets that P‟ entails „S knows that P‟ (see Unger 1975) but „S regrets that P‟ is, in most circumstances, a 
deviant answer to „How does S know that P?‟. The same point could be made about the relationship between 
„S admits that P‟ and „S knows that P‟. Admitting that P isn‟t usually a way of knowing that P (though one 
can perhaps imagine circumstances in which it might be).  
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but, as seasoned travellers know only too well, „S caught this morning‟s Eurostar from 
London‟ doesn‟t entail „S is now in Paris‟. Trains can break down. In explaining how S got 
to Paris by saying that he caught the Eurostar we are taking it for granted that none of the 
many things that could have gone wrong and prevented S from reaching Paris by train did 
go wrong. There are many background conditions that need to be fulfilled for catching the 
Eurostar to be a way of getting from London to Paris. In explaining S‟s now being in Paris 
by reference to his having caught the Eurostar this morning we presuppose, but do not state, 
that these conditions have been fulfilled. 
This is the key to understanding the barn case. The mere fact that an explanation of 
S‟s knowledge in terms of non-epistemic seeing is not knowledge-entailing does not make 
it a defective explanation. If that were the case we would also be forced to accept that S‟s 
explanation of his knowledge that Quine was born in Akron is defective but this is not 
something that we do or should accept. Of course, the two examples are different in another 
respect. In the Quine example, the proposed explanation is propositional even if it isn‟t 
factive. To say that S knows there is a barn nearby because he can see the barn is to explain 
his knowledge by reference to non-propositional seeing. Yet this is no reason to regard the 
explanation as defective. Seeing a barn nearby can provide one with the knowledge that 
there is a barn nearby as long as various background conditions are fulfilled. Some of these 
conditions are subjective, that is, conditions that the perceiver must fulfil. For example, he 
must know what a barn is. Other conditions are objective: for example, it mustn‟t be the 
case that he is in fake barn country. As long as we have no reason to suppose that these 
conditions are not fulfilled we should be happy to accept that someone who says „I can see 
it‟ has satisfactorily explained how he knows there is a barn nearby.  
 10 
It seems, then, that simple seeing can, in the right circumstances have a knowledge-
explaining role, and this is enough to justify the claim that it can have a knowledge-giving 
role in such circumstances. Unlike epistemic seeing, simple seeing is only conditionally 
knowledge-giving but this doesn‟t mean that it isn‟t a potentially a pathway to knowledge. 
Where does this leave Strawson‟s suggestion that we could not explain all the features of 
the concept of perception without reference to the concept of knowledge? In good shape, it 
would seem. It is clear enough that we could not explain all the features of the concept of 
epistemic perception without reference to the concept of knowing because it is built into the 
idea of this kind of perceiving that it is a form of knowing. Simple seeing is not a form of 
knowing but someone who doesn‟t grasp that it can nevertheless be a route to knowledge is 
arguably someone who lacks a full understanding of this form of perception. To bring this 
out imagine the following dialogue: 
Question: How do you know there is a barn over there? 
Answer: I can see it. 
Question: I know you can see it but how do you know that there is a barn over 
 there?  
Of course, there are circumstances in which the second question in this dialogue might be 
reasonable. Maybe the questioner thinks that the perceiver is in fake barn country. But if 
the questioner doesn‟t have anything like that in mind and asks his question simply because 
he cannot see what seeing the barn has got to do with knowing that there is barn over there 
then we would have to conclude that he doesn‟t know what seeing is. Perceiving does not 
always result in knowing but it is built into the concept of perception that it potentially a 
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pathway to knowledge. That is why we could not explain all the features of the concept of 
perception without reference to the concept of knowledge.
14
 
As a matter of fact, it isn‟t just the questioner‟s grasp of the concept of seeing that 
would be called into question by the above dialogue. One might also wonder how good a 
grasp he has of the concept of knowledge. For just as it is fundamental to our grasp of the 
concept of perception that we recognize it as a source of knowledge so one might think that 
it is fundamental to our grasp of the concept of knowledge that we think of it as something 
that perception can give us. This would be one way of understanding Strawson‟s suggestion 
that the concept of knowledge can‟t be fully elucidated without reference to the concept of 
sense perception. It is to this suggestion that I now turn.      
3. Knowledge and Perception. 
A familiar idea is that if we want to know what knowledge is then we need to start 
by analysing the concept of knowledge. On a reductive conception of analysis a successful 
analysis of this concept will be one that breaks it down into more basic concepts like truth, 
belief and justification. The sense in which these concepts are more basic is that they can 
themselves be analysed or explained without any reference to the concept of knowledge. 
And if concepts like truth, belief and justification are, in this sense, more basic than the 
concept of knowledge then they can be used to give non-circular necessary and sufficient 
conditions for knowing. Once we have come up with such conditions we can claim to have 
given a reductive analysis of the concept of knowledge and thereby to have answered the 
question „What is knowledge?‟. 
Where does this leave specific sources of knowledge such as perception? Someone 
who thinks that knowledge is, say, justified true belief should, of course, be happy to agree 
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that perception is a source of knowledge. His point is that that our fundamental 
understanding of the concept of knowledge is in terms of concepts like truth, belief and 
justification, and that this is what makes it intelligible that perception is a source of 
knowledge. Perception is a source of knowledge because it is a source of justified true 
beliefs about the world around us. But the fact that perception is a source of knowledge 
doesn‟t mean that the concept of knowledge can‟t be fully elucidated without reference to 
the concept of perception. The concept of knowledge has already been fully elucidated at 
the point at which we arrive at non-circular necessary and conditions for knowing.  
On this account, the connection between knowledge and perception is derivative 
rather than primitive. What this means is that we understand how perception can be a 
source of knowledge only because we have a prior understanding of generic conditions for 
knowing, conditions such as truth, belief and justification. To characterize these conditions 
as generic is to make the point that there are many different ways in which they can be 
realized. Perceiving that P is a way of knowing that P in so far as it is a way of coming to 
have the justified true belief that P but one can also come to have the justified true belief 
that P in many other ways. Knowers don‟t have to be perceivers. It surely makes sense to 
suppose that a non-perceiving creature (God?) can know things, and this suggests that we 
should be sceptical about the idea, mentioned above, that our fundamental understanding of 
knowledge is as what perception gives us. Our fundamental understanding, one might 
think, is in terms of the more generic conditions on knowing that reductive analyses of the 
concept of knowledge try to identify. 
As we have seen, Strawson is no fan of reductive conceptual analysis. In Analysis 
and Metaphysics he argues as follows against the reductive model of analysis: the general 
 13 
implication of the name „analysis‟ seems to be that of „the resolution of something complex 
into elements and the exhibition of the ways the elements are related in the complex‟ (1992: 
17). Chemical analysis stops with chemical elements, physical analysis with physical 
elements, and so on. In each case „we stop with items which are, from the point of view of 
the investigation in question, completely simple, the ultimate elements as regards that kind 
of analysis‟ (1992: 17). If this is how we think of conceptual analysis we should conclude 
that: 
our task was to find ideas that were completely simple, that were free from internal 
 conceptual complexity; and then to demonstrate how the more or less complex ideas 
 that are of interest to philosophers could be assembled by a kind of logical or 
 conceptual construction out of these simple elements (1992: 17). 
Strawson rightly describes this project as implausible but he suggests that the associated 
„dismantling‟ (1992: 19) model of analysis continues to exercise „a certain influence on the 
philosophical mind‟ (1992: 18). Here is his evidence for this surprising suggestion: 
 When confronted with the task of giving a philosophical elucidation of some 
 particular concept – say that of someone‟s knowing something to be the case or that 
 of someone‟s perceiving some material object- we often attack it by trying to set 
 out in general terms, both the conditions which must be satisfied if the concept is to 
 be correctly applied and the conditions which are such that the concept must be 
 correctly applicable if those conditions are satisfied. That is to say, in our jargon, we 
 try to ascertain necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of the 
 concept (1992: 18). 
 14 
As Strawson acknowledges someone who operates in this way needn‟t think that the object 
of the exercise is to include only absolutely simple concepts in specifying necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the correct application of the target concept. For example, those 
who analyse knowledge in terms of belief don‟t typically think that the concept of belief 
can‟t itself be analysed further. So why think that the dismantling model of analysis is 
doing any serious work here? Because those who try to ascertain necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the correct application of concepts like knowledge and perception almost 
always assume that the conditions they come up must be non-circular. But circularity is 
only a problem if  
 we are thinking in terms of that model of analysis which represents it as a kind of 
 dismantling of a complex structure into simpler elements, a process which 
 terminates only when you reach pieces which cannot be further dismantled; for this 
 process has not even begun if one of the alleged pieces turns out to be, or to contain, 
 the very concept, that was to be dismantled (1992: 19). 
By the same token, once we abandon the dismantling model we are free to adopt 
Strawson‟s non-reductive „network‟ model of analysis. This requires us to think of concepts 
as belonging to an elaborate network of concepts such that the function of each concept can 
only be understood by grasping its connections with the others. If this becomes our model, 
„there will be no reason to be worried if, if the process of tracing connections from one 
point to another of the network, we find ourselves returning to, or passing through, our 
starting-point‟ (1992: 19).   
            How compelling is Strawson‟s objection to the reductive model of analysis? That 
depends on whether it is plausible that those who seek necessary and sufficient conditions 
 15 
for the application of concepts like knowledge only think that an acceptable analysis must 
be non-circular because they are in the grip of the dismantling model, which models all 
analysis on chemical analysis. This seems far-fetched. The usual worry about circularity is 
that analyses that suffer from this defect are somehow question-begging or unilluminating, 
perhaps in the sense that someone who does not already have the concept being analysed 
would be left none the wiser by the proposed analysis. Whatever the merits of this objection 
to circular analyses, it is not obvious that it can only be motivated by a commitment to the 
dismantling model. While this model might have been historically influential there is surely 
no intrinsic connection between it and the idea that circular analyses are unacceptable. 
Fortunately, there are better objections to the project of analysing the concept of 
knowledge in more basic terms than the one that Strawson presses. For example, it might 
be argued that that the concept of knowledge is prior to, and more basic than, the concept of 
justified belief and so cannot be reductively analysed as justified true belief + X.
15
 Timothy 
Williamson makes this point in Knowledge and its Limits, where he argues that only 
knowledge can justify belief.
16
 Another Williamsonian argument against the reductive 
project is inductive. Surely non-circular necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing 
would already have been discovered if they were discoverable? It might also be pointed out 
that few concepts have reductive analyses and that there is no reason to expect the concept 
of knowledge to be special in this regard.  
This is not the place for a detailed assessment of these arguments, though it is worth 
pointing out that they are all, to varying degrees, controversial.
17
 For example, externalists 
who think that the justificational status of a belief is a function of the reliability of the 
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 16 
processes that caused it won‟t agree that only knowledge can justify belief. A belief can be 
caused by a highly reliable process without the believer knowing that this is so. Here we 
have a case in which a belief is justified alright but not by a proposition that the believer 
knows. To keep things simple, however, let us suppose that one or more of Williamson‟s 
arguments is successful and that they are all arguments of which Strawson could happily 
avail himself.
18
 The question that now arises is this: if we are not to explain what 
knowledge is by producing a standard reductive analysis of the concept of knowledge what 
is the alternative? Strawson talks about tracing the connections between different but 
interrelated concepts in a network of concepts but it is not clear how this is to be cashed 
out. The remarks on this topic in Analysis and Metaphysics are highly suggestive but also 
frustratingly metaphorical.  
Here is one way of making Strawson‟s idea a bit more concrete: if a person knows 
that P then there must be a specific way in which he knows that P.
19
 He can‟t „just know‟ 
without there being a way in which he knows. This connects with the point, made above, 
that if it is correct to describe a person S as knowing that P then there must be an answer to 
the question „How does S know that P?‟. This question is one to which knowers are always 
exposed because there must always be a way in which they know what they know and 
because it is the way that the question is after.
20
 So what would a good answer to „How do 
                                                 
18
 Williamson‟s best argument, and the one in which I believe he has the greatest faith, is the inductive 
argument. 
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 For a defence of this claim see Williamson 2000 and Cassam 2007. My conception of „ways of knowing‟ is, 
however, different from Williamson‟s. He conceives of knowledge as a determinable and specific ways of 
knowing as determinates of the determinable. So, for example, the sense in which seeing is a way of knowing 
is analogous to the sense in which being red is a way of being coloured. A way of knowing in my sense is 
more like a way of coming to know or, more accurately, the basis on which one knows. The idea that 
someone who asserts that P is directly exposed to the question „How do you know?‟ is one that Austin 
emphasizes in his paper „Other Minds‟ (Austin 1979). 
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 Actually, this is a bit of an oversimplification. As Austin points out there are many different ways of 
understanding and answering the question „How do you know?‟. Consider this dialogue: „There is a bittern at 
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you know?‟ look like? There are many different ways of answering this question but the 
most straightforward answer will be one that identifies the source or basis of one‟s 
knowledge. Genuine knowledge can‟t be baseless or have no source and that is why 
explaining how one knows is fundamentally a matter of identifying the source or basis of 
one‟s knowledge – one‟s way of knowing.21 
Take the proposition that there is a barn in front of me. Clearly, there are many 
different ways in which I can know that this proposition is true. Maybe I know it is true 
because, even though I can‟t see it, I can remember that there is a barn in front of me. Or 
maybe someone told me that there is a barn in front of me. As noted above, however, there 
is no better explanation of my knowledge than one that appeals to perception. If I can see 
the barn or see that there is a barn in front of me then nothing further needs to be done to 
explain my knowledge. The point here is that perceptual explanations of our knowledge 
have a kind of intrinsic intelligibility or transparency that few other explanations possess. 
Indeed, such is the power of the perceptual model of knowledge that some have concluded 
that „we have knowledge when and only when it is appropriate to speak of perceiving the 
truth‟ (Ayers 1991: 126).22 This is, no doubt, something of an exaggeration but there is still 
something right about the idea that perceiving is the paradigmatic explanation of knowing. 
                                                                                                                                                    
the bottom of my garden‟. „How do you know?‟. „I was brought up in the Fens‟. There are circumstances in 
which this would be a perfectly appropriate answer but being brought up in the Fens is not a way of knowing 
that there is a bittern at the bottom of one‟s garden or knowing anything else for that matter.   
21
 It is because genuine knowledge can‟t be baseless that self-knowledge seems so paradoxical. Those who 
think that so-called self-knowledge is baseless or groundless often conclude that it isn‟t really knowledge. My 
view is that self-knowledge is knowledge but that it isn‟t baseless. My knowledge that I am in pain, for 
example, is not based on evidence but it doesn‟t follow that it is based on nothing. There is a way in which I 
know that I am in pain: I can feel it. This raises all sorts of question about ways of knowing and self-
knowledge that I can‟t go into here. 
22
 Ayers is here describing what he takes to be Locke‟s view. Kant‟s conception of knowledge as requiring 
both intuitions and concepts is also relevant here since sensible intuitions are perceptions. 
 18 
If perceiving is that paradigmatic explanation of knowing then this tells us 
something important about the concept of perception.
23
 It tells us that it is built into this 
concept that perception is, at least potentially, a route to knowledge. Someone who doesn‟t 
understand this is someone who doesn‟t fully understand what perceiving is. But the 
explanatory link between perceiving and knowing also reveals something important about 
the nature of knowledge or the concept of knowledge. It reveals that knowledge is the kind 
of state that one can get into by perceiving. We understand what knowledge is by 
understanding how it comes about and perception is a key source of knowledge. It is in this 
sense that our fundamental understanding of knowledge is as what is yielded by perception 
in certain circumstances.
24
 This is not a reductive account of knowledge, since the concept 
of perception isn‟t more basic than the concept of knowledge, but it is a functional account, 
one that explicates knowledge in relation to its inputs.
25
 The guiding intuition here is that 
one gets a grip on the kind of state that knowing is by getting a grip on how one gets into 
that state. Perceiving is of central importance in this connection because someone perceives 
that P is someone who knows that P. 
If this is along the right lines then it vindicates Strawson‟s suggestion that we could 
not fully elucidate the concept of knowledge without reference to the concept of perception. 
Indeed, Strawson‟s formulation is, in the light of the present discussion, something of an 
understatement. The point is rather that we could not even begin to elucidate the concept of 
                                                 
23
 One might wonder why it tells us something about the concept of perception and not about perception. The 
sensible thing to think is that it tells us something about both. I don‟t make much of the distinction between 
perception and the concept of perception or between the concept of knowledge and knowledge itself. For an 
account that makes much more of this distinction see Kornblith 2002. 
24
 The qualification „in certain circumstances‟ is due to Snowdon and is needed to deal with, among other 
things, fake barn scenarios. 
25
 See Snowdon 1998 for a somewhat different gloss on idea of a functional account of psychological 
concepts. Snowdon takes seeing to be a functional concept. If seeing is a functional concept in Snowdon‟s 
sense then there will be functional truisms about seeing roughly of the following form: if S sees O then S is 
capable of G-ing. See Snowdon 1998: 308.   
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knowledge without reference to the concept of perception. If this makes it difficult to make 
sense of the idea of knowers who aren‟t perceivers then so be it. We have also now 
succeeded in putting some flesh on the bones of the notion of a non-reductive analysis or 
elucidation of the concept of knowledge. Someone who seeks to explicate the concept of 
knowledge by talking about ways of knowing is certainly not in the business of dismantling 
the concept or analysing it in terms of others that are independently intelligible. On the 
present account, the concepts of knowledge and perception hang together in just the way 
that Strawson suggests. Neither is more basic than the other. 
There are two major worries about my neo-Strawsonian account of knowledge that 
need to be addressed. The first worry is this: even if we agree that we understand what it is 
to know by understanding how knowledge comes about why privilege perception among all 
the different sources of knowledge? It was suggested above that perceptual explanations of 
our knowledge have a kind of intrinsic intelligibility that few other explanations possess but 
why think that? In answer to the question „How do you know there is a barn in front of 
you?‟ is the answer „He told me that there is‟ in any worse shape than „I can see it‟?. In 
what sense is the latter explanation any better than one in terms of testimony? As long as 
we consider knowers in social isolation we might be tempted to privilege perceiving in 
relation to other ways of knowing but as soon as we think of knowers as belonging to 
groups or communities of knowers it is not so obvious that perceptual explanations of our 
knowledge are any more fundamental than testimonial explanations.
26
  
  The bark of this objection is worse than its bite. Of course it is true that we live in 
communities of knowers and that testimony rather than perception is the source of much of 
                                                 
26
 Making too much of perceptual ways of knowing can also make it difficult to account for a priori 
knowledge, unless one thinks that it is acceptable to account for this kind of knowledge in terms of some  kind 
of quasi-perceptual rational intuition.   
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our knowledge. The fact remains, however, that testimonial knowledge is epistemologically 
not on par with perceptual knowledge. If you tell me that there is a barn in front of me it 
doesn‟t follow that there is a barn in front of me. It does follow if I see that there is a barn 
in front of me. Seeing with one‟s own eyes is, in this sense, a more basic way of knowing 
than taking someone else‟s word for it. Furthermore testimony can transmit knowledge but 
it can‟t generate it.27 If you tell me that P I can thereby come to know that P only if you 
already know that P. Perception is important because, very roughly, it explains how anyone 
knows anything in the first place. Of course, one can also acquire knowledge by inference 
but inferences need premises and one of the roles of perception is to provide the premises 
for our inferences.
28
  
A more serious concern is this: suppose we agree that perception is a basic source of 
knowledge. What makes it so? A minimalist is someone who thinks that the connection 
between knowledge and perception is primitive and cannot be explained any further. On 
this view, it is just a brute fact that perceiving is the paradigmatic explanation of knowing 
and that is all there is to it. On the face of it, minimalism is highly implausible.
29
 Surely we 
want to say that perceiving is a way of knowing because, and only because, there are more 
general conditions on knowing that P that one satisfies in virtue of perceiving that P. But 
these general conditions are just the conditions that traditional analyses of the concept of 
knowledge have tried to uncover. For example, one might think that knowledge requires 
reliability and that perception only qualifies as a source of knowledge because it satisfies 
the reliability condition on knowing. In that case, it might seem to follow that explaining 
                                                 
27
 Audi has frequently made this point in his writings. See, for example, Audi 2006. The view that testimony 
cannot generate knowledge is challenged in Lackey 1999. For some powerful criticisms of Lackey‟s proposal 
see Fairley, forthcoming. 
28
 This is, of course, the point of the so-called „regress argument‟ for foundationalism. 
29
 See Cassam 2007 for further discussion. 
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the link between perceiving and knowing requires a prior reductive analysis of the concept 
of knowledge in terms of concepts like reliability. 
Fortunately, this doesn‟t follow. It is true that minimalism is implausible but there is 
a middle way between minimalism and the idea that a prior reductive analysis of the 
concept of knowledge is needed to make it intelligible that perceiving is a way of knowing. 
The point is this: clearly perceiving wouldn‟t be a way of knowing if it didn‟t satisfy certain 
general necessary conditions on knowing, such as the reliability condition. However, the 
identification of such conditions neither requires a reductive analysis of the concept of 
knowledge nor implies that any such analysis is possible. Specifically, it does not imply 
that it is possible to supply non-circular necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing. It 
only implies the existence of necessary conditions. A non-reductive elucidation of the 
concept of knowledge can acknowledge the existence of such conditions. Elucidating the 
concept of knowledge is therefore not just a matter of spelling out the links between the 
concept of knowledge and the concept of perception. It is also a matter of tracing the 
complex connections between the concept of knowledge and many other concepts such as 
reliability, sensitivity and safety. There is nothing here with which Strawson would need to 
disagree. If anything, it brings out the full force of his connective model of analysis. On the 
one hand, there are generic conditions on knowing that help us to grasp the link between 
perceiving and knowing. On the other hand, the fact that perceiving is a paradigmatic way 
of knowing helps us to flesh out the generic necessary conditions on knowing: we can get a 
fix on the kind of reliability that knowing requires by reference to the reliability of sense-
perception. Given that perceiving is a basic way of knowing the reliability that knowing 
requires had better not be any greater than the reliability of perception.  
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4. Philosophical Methodology. 
Rereading Analysis and Metaphysics roughly a decade and a half after it was first 
published one is struck by the extent to which it anticipates recent developments in the 
philosophy of philosophy. The lectures on which the book is based were given at a time 
when most analytic epistemologists were busy trying, and failing, to come up with Gettier-
proof reductive analyses of the concept of knowledge. Strawson is rightly dismissive of this 
way of doing things, even if some of his objections to reductive analysis leave something to 
be desired. In the last few years, more philosophers have come round to Strawson‟s view of 
things. As we have seen, Williamson‟s criticisms of reductive analysis are very much in the 
spirit of Strawson‟s discussion, and the idea that this form of analysis is a dead end has 
become, if anything, the new orthodoxy. In this respect, Strawson was well ahead of his 
time. 
The biggest challenge facing the new anti-reductionists is to say what the alternative 
is. Whatever the limitations of the reductive project at least the rules of the game were 
relatively clear. The minute one talks about „elucidating‟ rather than analysing the concept 
of knowledge it becomes much less clear how we are to proceed or how success is to be 
measured. Strawson‟s account of non-reductive analysis in Analysis and Metaphysics raises 
more questions that it answers but it least the questions it raises are the right ones. What it 
points to is the possibility of an illuminating account of knowledge that focuses on sources 
rather than conditions of knowledge. It remains to be seen whether approach can be made 
to work but it certainly has enough going for it to merit a closer look.  
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